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We consider a model of power distribution in a social system where a set of agents play a simple
game on a graph: the probability of winning each round is proportional to the agent’s current power,
and the winner gets more power as a result. We show that, when the agents are distributed on simple
1D and 2D networks, inequality grows naturally up to a certain stationary value characterized by a
clear division between a higher and a lower class of agents. High class agents are separated by one
or several lower class agents which serve as a geometrical barrier preventing further flow of power
between them. Moreover, we consider the effect of redistributive mechanisms, such as proportional
(non-progressive) taxation. Sufficient taxation will induce a sharp transition towards a more equal
society, and we argue that the critical taxation level is uniquely determined by the system geometry.
Interestingly, we find that the roughness and Shannon entropy of the power distributions are a very
useful complement to the standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini index and the Lorenz
curve.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inequality of income, wealth or power is one of the
main social and political concerns [1, 2], since it under-
mines social welfare, democracy [4] and economic growth
[3]. Thus, a correct understanding of the dynamics of
inequality has become one of the main research topics of
theoretical social science and economics. There are dif-
ferent theoretical approaches in order to explain social
inequality [5, 6]. On one hand there are models based
on the disparity of human abilities, which claim that in-
equality increases are related to a large extent to the
growth in technological complexity, that puts a bigger
prize on certain rare skills. On the other hand there are
theoretical approaches based on self-organization and the
intrinsic instability associated to the accretion of wealth:
money begets money. In addition, there are institutional
and political factors, such as taxation or other govern-
mental policies, which bear a strong influence on social
inequality [1, 2, 7].
Statistical mechanics can play a significant role in this
endeavour. The interchange of wealth between individu-
als was compared to the interchange of energy between
the molecules of a gas which leads to the Boltzmann-
Gibbs distribution. Yet, in 1960 Mandelbrot [8] remarked
the difficulty of making this view compatible with one of
the main empirical observations about the distribution of
income or wealth, known as Pareto’s law: the population
with income above u falls like u−α for large enough u. In
1996, Stanley et al. [9] remarked that power-laws were, in
fact, ubiquitous in physical systems with long-range cor-
relations. Moreover, they coined the term econophysics,
in analogy to biophysics, to describe the application of
statistical mechanical concepts and methods to the study
of the economy [10], with agents playing the role of atoms
[11–14].
These agents can be simple or complex, and in mod-
ern approaches they are even allowed to learn from their
experience [15]. Most analysis in econophysics favor
agents following simple rules, yet showing rich dynam-
ics. In 2000, Bouchaud and Me´zard showed that a sim-
ple model with random speculative trading might be
mapped to the well-known problem of directed poly-
mers [16], showing a rather sharp transition between a
relatively egalitarian and an extremely unequal phase.
The same year, Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko [17], and
Chakraborti and Chakrabarti [18], used simple models
with conserved wealth and random interchanges, with or
without savings, to describe different equilibrium distri-
butions. These models were found to yield Pareto distri-
butions in some regimes [19–25], see [26–28] for reviews.
Some recent models have considered the effect of personal
savings and taxation [29]. Other studies have focused on
the appearance of social classes [30], the extraordinary
velocity of growth of the top earners [31] or how inequal-
ity may induce economic crisis without requiring external
shocks [32]. Many of these models are built on multi-
plicative stochastic processes, for which the approach to
equilibrium can be extremely slow, and the validity of
the ergodic hypothesis is questionable [32–35, 37]. Inter-
estingly, recent work shows that pooling and sharing of
resources (i.e. redistribution) may increase the growth
rate [36, 37].
We propose an extremely simple model combining
some features which are already present in the literature:
(a) agent interactions that amplify inequalities: the more
you earn, the easier it is to earn even more; this active
element of wealth motivates us to call it power; (b) ge-
ometric constraints: agents can only interact with their
neighbors; (c) a global redistributive mechanism, which
we will call taxation. In addition we have explored the
above features in a graph and have quantified the wealth
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2inequality using both standard measures and statistical
mechanical concepts which are not usual in the econo-
physics context, such as the roughness and the Shannon
entropy. As we will show, our proposed dynamics gives
rise generically to a higher and a lower class of agents, cre-
ated through the amplification of initial random fluctu-
ations in combination with geometrical constraints. The
stationary state is strongly dependent on the early his-
tory of the system, and ergodicity is broken when taxa-
tion is absent. Low amounts of taxation can have subtle
counter-intuitive consequences. Yet, high enough tax lev-
els lead to a phase transition towards a much more equal
system, where ergodicity is restored.
Similar phenomena of amplification of random fluc-
tuations make appearance in other areas. For exam-
ple, many models of interfacial dynamics show a higher
growth rate at peaks than at valleys, giving rise to the so-
called shadowing instability [38, 39], which explains e.g.
the characteristic flower-like shapes of bacterial colonies
in a medium with limited nutrients [40, 41]. More-
over, fluctuations are also amplified in Po´lya’s urn model
[42, 43], where we are asked to pick a ball from an urn
and replace it with several balls of the same color. Inter-
estingly, Po´lya’s urn model has found several applications
in social science, e.g. to innovation [44].
We would like to emphasize that our model is built on
two elements which have been widely employed in the sta-
tistical mechanics and the econophysics literature: ran-
dom interchanges leading to unequal distributions and a
smoothing mechanism. Our focus, nonetheless, will be
on their interaction through a graph and the geometri-
cal constraints imposed on the growth of inequality. The
aim of this work is merely to present an extremely simple
statistical mechanical model whose merit is to character-
ize how the amplification of noisy events can give rise to
the creation of a strong class division, and some efficient
ways through which these effects might be mitigated. We
do not put forward any claims regarding actual social in-
equality.
The article is organized as follows. Section II discusses
the power game in some detail. The case of two players
is exposed in Sec. III. In Sec. IV we consider a one-
dimensional array of players in detail, combining tools
from economics, information theory and kinetic rough-
ening. Other graph structures are discussed in Sec. V,
clarifying the nature of the transition. The article ends
with conclusions and some suggestions for further work.
II. THE POWER GAME
Let us consider N agents, connected through a certain
graph G. Agent i is endowed with a certain magnitude
which we will call power, wi ≥ 0. Total power is normal-
ized to be one,
N∑
i=1
wi = 1, (1)
The initial distribution of power will always be homoge-
neous, i.e. wi = 1/N for all i.
At each round, a randomly selected agent i will pro-
pose a bet to her neighbors within the graph [49]. The
agent will bet a certain fraction of her power, αwi with
α < 1, and her neighbors will be required to call the
bet. Neighbor players whose power is larger than αwi
are forced to do so, all others are discarded. Let Bi be
the set of active players, whose cardinal is mi. A winner
is chosen with probability proportional to their power,
i.e. the probability that player j ∈ Bi will win is
Pj =
wj
Zi
, Zi =
∑
k∈Bi
wk. (2)
After a winner is chosen, she earns an extra amount of
power αwi(mi − 1), and all others reduce their power in
the amount αwi. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the
basic power game procedure.
In order to determine a proper time scale, we will de-
fine a time-step as a sequence of N rounds of the power
game. During the first time step the homogeneous sys-
tem develops random fluctuations, and these fluctuations
will grow with time. In the long run, after a time of or-
der α−1, most agents will be ruined, possessing negligible
power, and a few of them will concentrate nearly all the
power. A clear class division can be established in our
case: agents who can call all possible bets by their neigh-
bors are termed powerful, and correspond to the higher
class. Agents who can not call some bets will be termed
powerless, or lower class. In some situations, a single
agent may accumulate all the power for long times.
A. Redistribution
In order to diminish the drive towards inequality, we
may introduce a global redistribution mechanism, which
we will call taxation. After each time-step, all players
will provide to a central authority an amount τwi of their
power, with a fixed τ < 1 that we will call the tax rate.
The total collected amount, which is equal to τ , is shared
equally among them. In other words:
wi 7→ wi − τwi + τ/N. (3)
Notice that taxation reduces the power possessed by in-
dividuals whose power exceeds the average value, 1/N ,
and increases the power of the rest. Also, notice that our
proposed taxation mechanism is non-progressive, since all
players must provide the same fraction of their power. It
is interesting to consider τ−1 to be the time-scale required
for the redistribution mechanism to reach an egalitarian
state, starting from any distribution.
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Figure 1: Top: Illustration of the power game for a one-
dimensional graph. First stage: the selected agent is depicted
in red, while the two neighbors appear in green, all others in
gray. The bar under each player indicates her power. Second
stage: players separate their bet. Third stage: a winner has
been chosen (player i + 1), and she receives all three bets.
Bottom: two profiles for a system with N = 50 and α = 0.01,
for short and long times (t = 1 and t = 1000). Notice that,
in the long run, high class agents are effectively separated by
low class ones.
B. Measuring inequality
The set of {wi} will be called a profile. We define
the width or roughness of the profile in similarity to the
definition in kinetic roughening [45]:
W 2 =
N∑
i=1
(
wi − 1
N
)2
, (4)
where we substract 1/N because it is the average power
possessed by all agents. Notice that W 2/N is the vari-
ance of the power.
Another useful measure of inequality is the Shannon
entropy of the profile, defined by [46]. Since all powers
{wi} are positive and add up to one, they can be regarded
as a probability distribution and we have
S = −
N∑
i=1
wi logwi. (5)
Notice that Neff = exp(S) can be used as an estimate for
the number of active players. In effect, if we choose an
agent k with probability wk, transmitting our choice will
require S bits, similarly to a choice among Neff equally
likely agents.
We will also consider a sorted version of the profile,
{ωi}, in non-increasing order: ω1 ≥ ω2 ≥ · · · ≥ ωN .
In other terms, ωk is the power possessed by the k-th
most powerful agent. It allows us to define the fraction
of agents with power larger than w, ρ(w), through the
following relation: ρ(w) = k/N when ωk = w. Moreover,
we will define the Lorenz curve [28], L(k/N) is the total
power possessed by the poorest k players:
L(k/N) =
k∑
i=1
ωN−i+1. (6)
The Lorenz curve allows to define the Gini coefficient [28]
of the distribution as the area between the Lorenz curve
and the perfect equality value, L(x) = x.
G ≡
∫ 1
0
dx (x− L(x)) . (7)
It can be shown to correspond to the expected value of
the differences of power of two different players, multi-
plied by N ,
G = N
N∑
i,j=1
|wi − wj |. (8)
In order to gather some intuition, let us consider a case
where Nu upper class agents concentrate all the power
among themselves, equally. The width of the distribution
can be found applying Eq. (4),
W 2 =
1
Nu
− 1
N
. (9)
The entropy of the distribution can be found to be
S = log(Nu), expressing the amount of information re-
quired to transmit the identity of an agent selected with
a probability equal to her power. On the other hand, the
Gini index can be found using Eq. (7), and it is
G = 1− Nu
N
, (10)
i.e. equal to the fraction of lower-class individuals.
4III. TWO PLAYERS GAME
Let us consider the case with two players, with powers
w1 and w2. With some abuse of notation, let us call wi(t)
the expected value for the power of the first player at time
t. The expected amount of the bet is α/2 (αwi(t) when
placed by player i). If she wins, she will gain an amount
of power ≈ α, but only with probability wi(t). Thus, the
expected value for wi(t+ 1) is given by
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) + α
(
wi(t)− 1
2
)
. (11)
This equation can be iterated, and we obtain
wi(t) =
1
2
+
(
wi(0)− 1
2
)
(1 + α)t. (12)
In other words, the expected value of the power will in-
crease (decrease) exponentially when the initial value is
above (below) 1/2, exp(±γt), with γ = log(1 + α).
This approach does not inform us about the fluctua-
tions. Thus, a more detailed calculation is needed. Table
I shows the payoff matrix for a single power game with
two players, depending on who is the gambler and who
is the winner.
Gambler Winner Probability Payoff
1 1 1
2
w1 +αw1
1 2 1
2
(1− w1) −αw1
2 1 1
2
w1 +α(1− w1)
2 2 1
2
(1− w1) −α(1− w1)
Table I: Payoff matrix for a single round of the power game
between two players.
The expected gain of player 1 is given by the following
expression:
E(Gain) =
∑
Prob.× Payoff = α
(
w1 − 1
2
)
. (13)
where the sum is implicitly extended over all possible
outcomes.
In order to obtain the variance of the gain of player 1,
we make use of Table II, where we describe the expected
squared deviations with respect to the expected payoff.
Thus, the variance of the payoff of player 1 is given by
V(Payoff) =
∑
Prob.× (Payoff− E(Payoff))2 = α
2
4
(14)
Both predictions, Eq. (13) and (14), are checked
against numerical simulations in Fig. 2 (d) and (e),
for a small number of rounds (100) and a low value of
α = 10−3. The fit is remarkably accurate.
Gambler Winner Probability (Payoff−E(Payoff))2
1 1 1
2
w1 α
2/4
1 2 1
2
(1− w1) α2(4w1 − 1)2/4
2 1 1
2
w1 α
2(4w1 − 3)2/4
2 2 1
2
(1− w1) α2/4
Table II: Fluctuations in the payoff of player 1.
Interestingly, the collapse of all deviation curves shown
in Fig. 2 (e) and predicted in Eq. (14) depends on the
precise rules employed. Appendix A discusses a slightly
different set of rules for which this collapse does not take
place.
Notice that, in the long run, the system can be in two
different absorbing states: one of the players will possess
all the power while the other will be ruined. The proba-
bility of ever visiting the other state becomes negligible
as the game length increases. This implies a breaking of
ergodicity [33–35, 37]: the stationary state of the system
depends on its (early) history, and can not be properly
called an equilibrium state.
IV. ONE-DIMENSIONAL POWER GAME
The power game, as described in Sec. II, is defined
on an arbitrary graph. We will consider in this section
the application to a number N of players displayed along
a ring. For all cases, we have run 100 simulations and
averaged the results, checking for convergence.
A. Without Taxes
The average width of the power distribution W , given
by Eq. (4), is shown as a function of time for different
numbers of players and values of α in Fig. 3 (a). In
all cases, the tax level was set to zero. The time axis is
rescaled, as αt, while the width axis is also rescaled, as
NW . Notice that all curves start at zero W , reaching
a saturation level for long times. The rescaling allows
all curves to have the same saturation, independently of
α and N , and a very similar saturation time. For short
times, W grows as a power law, W ∼ t1/2, in agreement
with Family-Vicsek scaling for kinetic roughening [45] in
the case of random deposition. Yet, before saturation
the width increases much faster. The inset shows that
this second stage of growth is, indeed, exponential, which
does not correspond to Family-Vicsek scaling.
The evolution of the Shannon entropy S, Eq. (5), is
shown in Fig. 3 (b). The time-axis is again rescaled as
αt, while the entropy is shown as exp(S)/N , in order to
make all curves collapse, for different values of N and α.
As it was argued, exp(S)/N denotes the fraction of upper
class agents, which converges to ≈ 1/3 for long times.
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Figure 2: Left: Two-player histogram of w1 using α = 10
−3 for different initial values w1(0) = 0.1 (a), 0.3 (b) and 0.5 (c) and
20 games, using 106 realizations for each case. (d) Average power of player 1 for the different initial conditions, w1(0) = 0.1 up
to 0.5 as a function of the round order. (e) Power deviation for the same cases. Notice the collapse of all curves, as predicted
in Eq. (14). Dashed lines are theoretical predictions, Eqs. (13) and (the square root of) (14).
The inset of Fig. 3 (b) shows the time evolution of the
Gini index, with time again scaled as αt. We notice that
it evolves from G = 0 to G ∼ 0.7. In the class division
picture, this value corresponds to the fraction of lower
class agents, which should be close to 2/3.
Thus, our observations are compatible with the con-
jecture that, for long times, the system is divided into an
upper class, containing ≈ 1/3 of the agents, roughly simi-
lar in power, and a lower class, with the rest of the agents.
The lower class agents possess negligible power, and are
unable to call the bets placed by the higher class agents.
Thus, the origin of the 1/3 fraction should be understood
in the following way: a stationary state is reached if each
high class agent is surrounded by two lower class ones
which are not neighbors of any other high class agent. A
typical distribution with this property can be built by al-
ternating one high class and two lower class agents, thus
giving rise to the observed division.
Moreover, two high class agents can never be neighbors
in the stationary state. That situation is unstable: in the
long run, one of them will always grab the power of the
other. So, when we start from a homogeneous state, the
mean value of the separation between high class agents
will be two in the long run. Yet, stationary states are not
perfect crystals, and this separation is sometimes higher
or lower. Even more: if we are allowed to start from an
inhomogeneous situation, we can tune this separation to
higher values. For example, an initial state with all power
in the hands of one of the agents will remain stationary.
Thus, we insist that our model is strongly non-ergodic.
We can obtain further insight about the power distri-
bution by considering the time evolution of the sorted
profile: {ωk}, as shown in Fig. 4 (a) for N = 103 and
α = 10−3. Not all values of ωk are shown, only one
out of every 10: k = 10m + 1. In an initial short time
regime, the values diverge exponentially from the initial
one, 1/N . But for αt ∼ 1, the maximal probability ω1
saturates. Even before, many of the lesser agents have
started an extremely fast decay.
In Fig. 4 (b) and (c) we show the full sorted profile,
{ωk}. Fig. 4 (b) shows these sorted profiles for different
times for the previous system, N = 103 and α = 10−3.
Notice that, for very short times, Nωk ∼ 1, while it grows
more and more unequal for larger times. The stationary
curve has been obtained with a good approximation for
t = 5000, the last curve. For t = 1 the sorted profile
is totally flat. We see that two classes develop from the
beginning, separated by a large step and with lower in-
ternal variance. As time evolves, the top part of the high
class barely change, but a few high class agents fall into
the lower class, as we see from the leftward shift of the
class boundary with time. Fig. 4 (c) shows the station-
ary sorted profiles reached for different values of N and
α.
The collapse of the top part of the profiles show that
the parameter α determines the time-scale, while N de-
termines the length scale. The continuum limit is ob-
tained for α→ 0 and N →∞.
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Figure 3: (a) Average width of the power distribution of the
1D power game as a function of time, for different values of
N and α. In all cases, the tax level τ = 0. The time axis
is rescaled as αt, while the width axis is rescaled as NW ,
in order to highlight the collapse at saturation. (b) entropy
decrease as a function of time, with the time-axis rescaled
as αt, and the entropy rescaled as exp(S)/N , because this
magnitude corresponds to the fraction of high class agents.
Notice that this fraction comes close to 1/3 in the long run.
B. With Taxes
Let us determine the effects of redistribution, through
the use of taxes, as shown in Eq. (3). As we will see,
a transition takes place for τ ∼ α, from an unequal dis-
tribution to a homogeneous one, with some unexpected
effects in the intermediate region.
Fig. 5 shows the width, entropy and Gini for a sys-
tem with N = 103, α = 10−3 and different taxation
levels. In Fig. 5 (a) we can see that the width, W , grows
for short times as W ∼ t1/2 in all cases. For low tax-
ation levels, τ < 3α, it still presents the same features
of the no-taxation case, with the accelerated growth of
the inequality near saturation, and the saturation lev-
els reached are similar. But above that threshold value,
the behavior changes drastically, with the saturation level
falling sharply after a small increase in the taxation level.
Fig. 5 (b) provides further information about this tran-
sition. We see the time evolution of the effective number
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Figure 4: (a) Time evolution of selected values of the sorted
profile, {ωk} with k = 10m+1, using N = 103 and α = 10−3.
The time axis is rescaled as αt. Notice the initial exponential
divergence, followed by saturation around αt ∼ 1. (b) and (c)
Full sorted profile as a function of the index k, with suitably
rescaled axes, for different values of time (b) and different
system sizes and values of α in the stationary state (c).
of players, or size of the high class, estimated from the
entropy, Eq. (5). Indeed, for τ < 3α this number decays
steadily down to a value of order N/3. Yet, for τ ≥ 3α,
the effective number of players does not seem to decay,
even in the long run. Thus, we conjecture that the sys-
tem is not divided into classes any more. The Gini index,
depicted in the inset of Fig. 5 (b), shows the same behav-
ior: it grows steadily to a value close to 0.7 for τ < 3α,
and remains close to zero for τ ≥ 3α.
Yet, a careful analysis of Fig. 5 (a) and (b) holds
a surprise more. Indeed, the long term Neff is not a
monotonously increasing function of τ : for τ = α it takes
a larger value than for τ = 2α, although just marginally
so. This effect is checked carefully in Fig. 5 (c), where
the stationary (long term) values of the three previous
observables (width W , entropy S and Gini G) are plotted
as a function of the taxation level, τ/α. Interestingly, we
observe in all three the same trend: a low taxation brings
7about a mild decrease in inequality. Yet, increasing the
taxation level from τ = α/2 to τ = 2α increases the in-
equality a tiny amount. If we increase the taxation level
further, inequality disappears sharply. The reason seems
to be that mild levels of taxation may have a counterintu-
itive effect on inequality: by providing enough power to
the worse-off agents, the high class agents are not effec-
tively isolated and can still compete among themselves.
Yet, we must stress that this slight uptake in the inequal-
ity rate as taxes grow is not a robust trait of the model,
as we have not been able to reproduce it in higher di-
mensional lattices (see Sec. V).
Fig. 6 (a), (b) and (c) show the time evolution of
selected values of ωk, for k = 10m + 1. Notice that for
τ = α, Fig. 6 (a), the evolution is very similar to the
case without taxes. For τ = 2α, Fig. 6 (b), the time axis
seems to be stretched, but inequality builds up anyway.
For τ = 3α, Fig. 6 (c), on the other hand, the system is
basically egalitarian, with a negliglible spread.
Fig. 6 (d) shows the stationary sorted profiles, {ωk}
for different taxation levels. For τ = 3α the profile is
basically flat, but we can see that the situation can be
involved for other taxation levels.
Within the economics literature, two curves present
special relevance: L(i/N), the Lorenz curve, defined in
Eq. (6) and the wealth function, ρ(w), defined as the
probability of finding an agent with power larger than w.
The interest of these functions, which are not usual in
the physics literature, is highlighted in Fig. 7. In Fig.
7 (a) we see the Lorenz curve for the aforementioned
cases. Notice that the diagonal line corresponds to the
case of perfect equality, while the area between the curve
and the diagonal line is the Gini index. We notice that
for very low taxation level the Lorenz curve is barely
different from the no-taxation one, while for larger values
the system changes drastically in a short span of taxation
levels.
The ρ(w) function is shown in Fig. 7 (b) for the
same systems. We also see the strong difference achieved
through a very small change in the taxation level for
τ ∼ α. For τ = 3α the wealth distribution ρ(w) has
a sharp decline around w = 1/N , showing a basically
egalitarian system. Yet, for τ ∼ α the curve becomes
more involved, with several steps, reflecting the complex
behavior of the stationary distribution for low taxation
levels.
It is relevant to ask whether these results are robust
under the presence of noise. We have performed numer-
ical experiments with noisy tax rates, i.e. the tax rate
for each agent becomes a random variable, uncorrelated
both in space and in time. Instead of a fixed value τ ,
the tax rate for each player at each time-step becomes
τi = τ(1 + Dη), where D ≥ 0 is a parameter and η is a
uniform variate in [−1, 1]. The results (not shown) are
virtually identical even for values of D ∼ 1/2. Indeed,
the average value of the taxation level seems to be the
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Figure 5: (a) Average width of the 1D power game with taxes,
using N = 103 and α = 10−3. The gray line stands for
a t1/2 growth. (b) Time evolution of the entropy and Gini
index of the distributions. (c) Stationary values of the number
of effective players, Gini index and roughness for the same
systems as a function of the tax level τ/α.
only relevant variable.
V. THE POWER GAME BEYOND 1D
It is relevant to ask about the statistical behavior of
the power distribution when the agents interact through
a more complex network. In this section we will consider
1D and 2D networks with interactions beyond nearest
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Figure 6: (a) to (c) Time evolution of the sorted power values,
ωk for selected values of k, with N = 10
3 and α = 10−3 and
different taxation levels. The time axis is rescaled as αt. (d)
Stationary values of the sorted profiles for different taxation
levels.
neighbors. Concretely, we will consider 1D rings with N
agents, and interaction range r = 1, 2 or 3, and periodic
2D square lattices with Lx×Ly = N agents with interac-
tion range r = 1 (nearest neighbors) and r = 2 (nearest
and next-nearest neighbors).
Fig. 8 shows the long-term stationary state of a power
game played on a 30× 30 lattice with periodic boundary
conditions and range r = 1, with α = 0.01 and no taxes.
The colorbox is scaled as Nw, where w is the power of
each agent, so that Nw = 1 correspond to the initial eq-
uitative distribution. Players are still divided into two
classes, and two high class players can not be together
along a horizontal or vertical line in the stationary state.
Yet, the configuration does not appear to present any
type of long-range order. Remarkably, despite the appar-
ent lack of a local order parameter, the number of high
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Figure 7: (a) Lorenz curves for the 1D power game with dif-
ferent levels of taxation, using N = 103 and α = 10−3. (b)
Probability of finding an agent with power larger than w, as
a function of w, for the same systems.
class players is one fifth of the total population, with a
rather good precision.
Fig. 9 (a) shows the expected value of the ratio of ef-
fective players, exp(S)/N , as a function of rescaled time:
Kαt, where K is the number of players in each round,
i.e. the coordination number plus one. In the present 2D
case, K = 5. We have plotted this average for several
topologies: 1D systems with range 1, 2 and 3 interac-
tions, and 2D systems with range 1 and 2 (next nearest
neighbors, so K = 9). In all cases, the number of effec-
tive players collapses in the short run, while its long-time
behavior changes in a straightforward way: the ratio of
effective players tends to 1/K.
The short-time collapse of exp(S)/N in Fig. 9 (a) sug-
gests that the relevant time-scale for the development
of inequality in the power game is 1/(Kα). Fig. 9 (b)
provides evidence to support this claim, by plotting the
expected value of the long-term fraction of high class
agents, exp(S)/N , as a function of the ratio τ/(Kα) for
the different system topologies explored in this section.
Notice that the transition takes place for τ/(Kα) ∼ 1,
i.e. when the time-scale needed to build inequality and
the time-scale needed to redistribute roughly coincide.
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Figure 8: Power profile in the steady state for a power game
played on a 30 × 30 square lattice with periodic boundaries.
The color index is Nw, where w is the power of each agent,
implying that Nw = 1 corresponds to the initial equitative
level. Notice that no high-class agent is neighbor to another
one, but otherwise the arrangement is disordered.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this article we have researched a random non-
strategic power game which may describe some features
associated to the accretion of wealth and power in social
systems. Even though the elements on which the game is
based are well known in the literature (random exchanges
leading to inequality and smoothing mechanisms), the
extreme simplicity of the model makes it specially inter-
esting and suitable for analysis in econophysics and in
statistical mechanics.
The resource distributed among the agents is called
power instead of wealth to emphasize its active charac-
ter: obtaining power makes an agent more likely to ob-
taining even more power. In other words, the probabil-
ity of winning each round is proportional to the current
power in possession of each agent. Thus, small fluctua-
tions are naturally enhanced, leading to a morphological
instability. At later stages, the agents can be divided
into classes: a high class, which can call all bets placed
by other agents, and a lower class, which can not. More-
over, the system presents broken ergodicity: there are
many possible stationary states, and an arbitrarily long
waiting time is required to jump from one to another.
Importantly, the game is local: each agent can only
play with her immediate neighbors. Thus, no two high
class players can be neighbors in the stationary state,
since one of them would ruin the other in the long run.
When the players are arranged around a ring, the dynam-
ics leads to stationary states where the number of effec-
tive players is, in average, one third of the total number
of agents. For other topologies, we found evidence that
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Figure 9: (a) Evolution of the expected value of the fraction
of effective players, exp(S)/N , as a function of rescaled-time,
Kαt, where K is the number of players for each round. Notice
that, in the long run, the stationary fraction is always 1/K.
(b) Expected value of the fraction of effective players as a
function of τ/(Kα) for different topologies. Notice the rather
sharp increase for τ ∼ Kα, denoting the phase transition from
an unequal to an egalitarian system. 1D systems operate with
N = 1000, 2D systems with Lx × Ly = 30× 30, so N = 900.
the final ratio of low-to-high class players corresponds to
the number of players in each neighborhood, K.
Starting from an equal distribution of power, early-
time dynamics is described by Family-Vicsek scaling cor-
responding to random deposition. Yet, for longer times,
the width of the interface grows exponentially, thus aban-
doning the Family-Vicsek paradigm. Shadowing instabil-
ities typically lead to diffusion limited aggregation (DLA)
behavior [38–40], which seems to be absent from our case.
The introduction of a redistribution mechanism can re-
vert this trend to the growth of inequality, but only if the
taxation level is high enough. We can consider this effect
in terms of a competition between time scales: τ−1 being
the time scale in which redistribution acts and (Kα)−1,
the time scale associated to the natural growth of in-
equality. According to our numerical analysis, τ > Kα
leads to an egalitarian society, with restored ergodicity,
while τ < Kα leads to a sharp class division. This result
is reminiscent of Piketty’s claim that inequality will grow
when the rate of return of capital r is larger than the rate
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of growth g of the whole economy, since r−1 and g−1 can
be thought as the time scales associated to capital and
economic growth. [2, 32, 47].
The above behaviours have been analyzed by using
different measures for the inequality of power, such as
the roughness of the profile, the Shannon entropy (which
leads to a natural estimate to the number of effective
players) and the Gini coefficient, always leading to simi-
lar conclusions.
Several elements have been left out in this first analysis
of the power game. The first one is the characterization
of the observed transition between a class society and an
egalitarian society. A second one is the analysis of more
realistic social network structures. In our 1D and 2D
examples, we obtain evidence of a well-known fact: in-
equality grows with globalization. In a fragmented world,
an agent can become the richest of a fixed domain, while
in a fully connected world the same agent can become
the wealthiest of the whole system. It is relevant to ask
how our observations will change for strongly inhomoge-
neous lattices, more similar to human societies, such as
scale-free and small-world networks.
Other interesting element to be considered in future
work is the inclusion of progressive taxation, in which
each player i would contribute a magnitude proportional
to wβi , leading to progressive taxation for β > 1 and
regressive for β < 1, which will present a richer phase
diagram. The role of economic initiative also leads to
interesting questions: in principle, it is always against
the interests of low-class players to place a bet. Thus,
low-class players will only play either under coercion or
under incomplete information. Coercion can be modu-
lated through inequality itself: powerful agents may be
able to force the acceptance of the bet. Yet, the role of in-
complete information is specially intriguing, since it has
been empirically found that a large fraction of respon-
dents have incorrect beliefs about the inequality levels of
their own country [48]. All these possibilities are worth
exploring in future work.
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Appendix A: Alternative set of rules for the two-player power game
As a check, we have considered an alternative version of the power game, in which the bet is fixed to α/2 instead
of being proportional to the power of the gambler. Table III shows the payoff matrix in this case for two players.
Gambler Winner Probability Payoff
1 1 1
2
w1 +α/2
1 2 1
2
(1− w1) −α/2
2 1 1
2
w1 +α/2
2 2 1
2
(1− w1) −α/2
Table III: Alternate power game, with a fixed bet.
Please notice that, in this variant of the game, the choice of the gambler is irrelevant, since the bet will always be
the same. We can estimate in this case the expected payoff and its variance, as we did in the standard power game,
obtaining the following result:
E(Payoff) = α
(
w1 − 1
2
)
, (A1)
V(Payoff) = α2w1 (1− w1) . (A2)
We observe that the expected gain coincides with the standard game, but the deviation is proportional to the initial
value of the power of player 1. Fig. 10 shows the histograms, expected power and deviation of the power of player 1,
similarly to Fig. 2. One can see that the histogram only contains delta peaks, since the amounts of power of player 1
can only be given by w1(t) = w1(0) +mα, where m ∈ Z.
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Figure 10: Alternate power game, with fixed bet α/2. Left: two-player histogram of w1(t) using α = 10
−3 for different initial
values w1(0) = 0.1 (a), 0.3 (b) and 0.5 (c) and 20 games, using 10
6 realizations for each case. (d) Average power of player 1 for
the different initial conditions, w1(0) = 0.1 up to 0.5 as a function of the round order. (e) Power deviation for the same cases.
Dashed lines constitute theoretical predictions, Eqs. (A1) and (the square root of) (A2).
